Late last week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the United States would impose a 10% tariff on all imported goods from eight European countries starting February 1, 2026 1. The measure was explicitly linked to these countries’ opposition to U.S. control over Greenland. The countries named were:
- Denmark
- Norway
- Sweden
- France
- Germany
- United Kingdom
- Netherlands
- Finland
According to the announcement, if no agreement were reached, the tariff rate would rise to 25% on June 1, 2026. Trump’s stated proposal involved what he described as a “complete and total purchase” of Greenland.
While the measure has since been placed on hold 2, the episode remains relevant. Trade policy under the current U.S. administration has proven highly volatile, and similar measures could re-emerge with limited notice. This report therefore focuses not on political motivations, but on trade exposure: which commodities would have been affected and how large the potential impact would be for both the eight European exporters and the United States.
Scope and methodology
This analysis examines U.S. import data since 2020 for the eight countries listed above. Values are reported on a CIF basis. Rate provision codes excluded from the dataset:
- 00 – Free into bonded warehouse or FTZ
- 11 – Entered into U.S. Virgin Islands
- 13 – Free, processed for export
- 14 – Free, items for vessels and aircraft
- 16 – Free, U.S. government
- 17 – Free, items for the handicapped
- 18 – Free, special duty programs
- 19 – Free, HS Chapter 99
These exclusions remove flows that are not meaningfully exposed to across-the-board import tariffs and would otherwise distort the assessment of tariff sensitivity.
Importance of the eight countries as U.S. suppliersh2
Since 2020, the eight countries have represented a material share of total U.S. imports, though with significant variation between them.
- Germany consistently ranks among the 4th–5th largest suppliers of goods to the United States. Cumulative exports since 2020 amount to approximately USD 835.5 billion, making Germany by far the most exposed country in absolute terms.
- The United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands typically rank between 10th and 20th, each exporting more than USD 100 billion to the U.S. over the same period.
- Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland rank within the top 50 U.S. suppliers, with export values below USD 100 billion but still economically significant in sector-specific terms.
Taken together, the group represents a substantial portion of U.S. import flows, particularly in high-value manufactured and technology-intensive goods.
Table 1. Ranking of the Eight European Countries as U.S. Import Suppliers
| Country | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 YTD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | 27 | 31 | 30 | 30 | 33 | 38 |
| Norway | 45 | 39 | 46 | 46 | 47 | 47 |
| Sweden | 25 | 27 | 27 | 24 | 24 | 25 |
| France | 15 | 15 | 14 | 12 | 15 | 15 |
| Germany | 5 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 5 |
| United Kingdom | 12 | 13 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 14 |
| Netherlands | 17 | 18 | 19 | 17 | 19 | 19 |
| Finland | 42 | 38 | 38 | 41 | 38 | 44 |
Commodity exposureh2
The chart below shows the top 10 commodities imported by the United States from these eight countries, excluding HS 9801 3. Each category is presented alongside its share of total U.S. imports for that commodity.
Several patterns stand out.
First, import exposure is highly concentrated. The five largest industrial and technology-intensive categories represent roughly one-third of total U.S. imports from these countries, while the top twenty account for approximately one-half. Germany’s export profile dominates several of these, but France, the UK, and the Netherlands also play major roles in specific sectors.
Second, while HS 9801 flows are excluded from the chart, they introduce some background noise in the aggregate data. HS 9801 covers:
Exports of articles imported for repairs etc.; imports of articles exported and returned, unadvanced; imports of animals exported and returned.
These movements are largely administrative or circular in nature and would be only marginally affected by tariffs, reinforcing the decision to exclude them from the core analysis.
Sector-level implicationsh2
Based on commodity composition and U.S. import dependence, the exposure can be broadly grouped as follows:
Table 2. Commodity Exposure of U.S. Imports from Selected European Countries
| Category | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Autos & parts | Critical. High import dependence, limited short-term substitution, and strong integration into U.S. manufacturing supply chains. |
| Aerospace & turbines | Critical. High value, strategic importance, and concentrated supplier base. |
| Pharmaceuticals & medical products | Economically critical, politically cushioned. Large trade values, but historically protected or mitigated through exemptions and negotiated carve-outs. |
| Refined petroleum products | Structurally important, tariff-resistant. Global pricing dynamics and fungibility reduce tariff effectiveness. |
| Spirits | Symbolic. Politically visible, economically marginal at the macro level. |
| Art and collectibles | Decorative noise. High unit values but negligible macroeconomic impact. |
This mix suggests that the proposed tariffs would not have been evenly distributed across the economy. Instead, they would have fallen most heavily on industrial supply chains, particularly in autos, aerospace, and advanced manufacturing.
Overall exposureh2
In aggregate, the proposed tariffs would have represented a non-trivial shock to transatlantic trade flows. The eight European countries involved are not peripheral suppliers; several are among the United States’ most important trading partners in high-value sectors.
At the same time, the concentration of imports in strategically sensitive categories suggests that the economic burden would not have been one-sided. U.S. manufacturers and downstream industries would likely have absorbed part of the impact through higher input costs, reduced margins, or supply chain disruptions.
While the measure is currently on hold, the episode illustrates how quickly large volumes of trade can be placed at risk through unilateral policy announcements. From a trade exposure perspective alone, the potential impact would have been significant for both sides.
Footnotesh2
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HS 9801 covers returned or repaired goods, which are not meaningfully exposed to import tariffs. ↩